What is mind?

My co-blogger asked me to define mind. It should have been an easy task, but it's not. The convention is that 'mind' is defined by some proposition or statement that demarcates mind from brain and everything else. And in so doing 'mind' is presented as a particular, specific sort of a thing. A this or that sort of thing and not another. This type of definition is a conceptual practice that presumes to provide some sort of grounding. So, when done, it can become a final  measure against which other definitions of mind can be assessed.

But no, I really don't get very far in my thinking when I try to come out with a definition. And that's because there isn't one that serves all occasions. Whenever I think of something that might pass muster, I have my doubts. I pass all the conditions mentioned by the philosopher Richard Rorty in his description of the liberal ironist:

I shall define an "ironist" as someone who fulfils three conditions: (1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her final vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself. (Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, p.73.)

So, my suggestion for this blog, is that we judge how others have defined or used 'mind' in their various writings and assess how and to what extent their usage is or has been useful to their enterprise. Which is basically a pragmatic attitude.